The purpose of this article is respond as Algery dealing with the brutal residual terrorism of 90’s. A phenomenon that leads to asking: Who are these new terrorists? How are organized? Who is financing terrorism in Algery?, How and with what method? What are its benefits? and, What is the strategy for an efficient fight against terrorism in Algery?
Note: [This is an automatic translation from Spanish original]
After the dark years of 1990, civil war, with 200,000 dead, and the Politics of National Reconciliation of President Bouteflika (debatable according to some opinions), a respectable lull gave hope to the Algerian people, but fear and anxiety then returned to the faces of recent and spectacular terrorist attacks that have rocked the 2007 and 2008 in northern Algeria, particularly the cities of Algiers and Kabylia.
It is that the former Algerian terrorism, born in the 90’s is for many locals as a sort of volcano, you were asleep for a few years, and so sporadic, spits boiling and angry, its devastating lava.
It should be appropriate that this is devastating but cells that respond to a sort of residual terrorism, sporadic, and not comparable in intensity or brutality, or the human and material losses, with one terrorism that the world filled with pain for almost 20 years. The security situation in Algeria has clearly improved, but this victory against the terror of the 90’s is also the cause that has led terrorists to change their methods and revise the decline in its expansive project.
Who are these terrorists, and how they are organized?
There is consensus (press, INTREPs, think-tanks) that activists of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI for spanish acrostic), the former Algerian SGPC, led by Abdel Droukel, aka Abdelwadoud, rely on a hard core (extremist jihadists ) Whose headquarters is located in the dense and impenetrable forest mountain in the region of Boumerdes, with communities scattered throughout the forest in the area. This core maintains the unity and coordination of several groups of survivors of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of the 90. The chain continues by activists who are moving into freedom: former high-level military, today dogmatic Islamists, foreign jihadists in particular from neighbouring countries, disappointed young Algerian politics and at the end of the chain, young adolescents in urban-popular desperate situation. Clearly the latter segment is subjected to a real work of indoctrination, for whom the Algerian press called “traffickers of death”.
During the 90’s organization GSPC was distributed in nine wilayas, currently AQMI works with only four, namely, the North Kabylia, east and the Sahara. At the head of each wilaya, a chief post by Droukel called “Emir”, which in turn provides a number of brigades led by heads of cell. Many Emirs have been killed by security forces, others took advantage of the National Reconciliation Act to lay down their arms. The pressure against them is great, a few days ago (July 19) the Treasury Department froze U.S. assets partners in the country to four Northern Emirs “political”.
In steps to make this deposition weapon is the group of the Sahara. As I explained Hamida Layachi, director of the Algiers daily Djazair News, in this reason that Al Qaeda for the Maghreb has been weakened by its own internal conflicts between the wing of Kabylia, of Arabs, and the desert, which heads the mythical emir of wilaya 9, Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Spying with intensity over the years this has split the organization and is negotiating his surrender with authorities. Some say that even this has already happened and that Belmokhar be in the hands of the Algerian army somewhere in the Sahara. On areas of the West Algerian seem fair that it should be noted that those borders of the West and its mountainous relief brought by the Algerian anti-terrorist units as a logistics base for AQMI. In fact, Algerian Gendarmerie after the capture of several bands border confiscated several thousand anti-personal mines and other weapons.
Financing of Terrorism in Algeria How and what that means?
The issue of financing of terrorism in Algeria is subject to much speculation. Some situations are easy to disclose a change, others remain the domain of suspicion. The first case there is clarity regarding the internal financing (Algeria), the outside, namely that many Algerians suspected they were not so vivid you can connect its linkage with international governmental and non-governmental, non-sponsored or by foreign governments , Democratic or not.
If we follow the assertions of security officials from Algeria, Salafism would have control of much of drug trafficking from Morocco. Other newspapers speak bluntly of laundering money through real estate. Recent years have also seen the use of kidnapping as a new way to rescue the coffers of AQMI.
The Algerian Interior Minister, told the Senate on May 15 last, the number of kidnappings registered in Algeria during 2007 amounted to 375. Of these, 115 cases were related to terrorism. The total volume of money demanded by the abductors in cases of kidnappings committed by terrorists was estimated at 6 billion dinars.
But this is not the only source of income, as the Jihadist Salafism is using pure and simple banditry. The main armed attacks, looting and theft of property carried out by common criminals are beginning to have linkages, as the ex post facto approval by the Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb him. As happened in the 70’s and 80’s in South America, where common criminals came into contact with political prisoners with military preparedness. The Algerian press has noticed these links in attacks on several banks, post offices, petrol stations and businesses, especially in small towns and isolated. Where the theft of cars, trucks, livestock and menudencias as cellular telephones, then sold in the shuks Tunisians, Moroccans, Malians… etc..
The editorial stressed that the jihadist organization seems to transit towards a system of Italian Mafia, vacuum increasingly fund their ideological Jihad. However consulted Hamida Layachi by the settlement, said that this is not necessarily unliquidated AQMI but by reforming Islam in Algeria, starting with that practised in the mosques. Layachi explains: “These are still almost all out of control and they spread Salafism. Hence the violence there is only one step. “